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WHEN PIGS FLY:
LITIGATION UNDER THE AIR CARRIER ACCESS ACT
CURTIS D. EDMONDS*
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 17, 2000, Maria Tirotta Andrews, a person with a cardiac
disability, boarded a USAirways plane at the Philadelphia airport bound for
Seattle.' Ms. Andrews was accompanied by what she claimed was a
service animal to help her relieve stress-a 300-pound 2 Vietnamese pot-
bellied pig named Charlotte.3 USAirways allowed Ms. Andrews to board
the plane, even going so far as to seat Charlotte and her in first class.
4
According to published reports, on arrival at the Seattle airport, Char-
lotte began to misbehave, running loose through the plane and attempting at
one point to enter the cockpit. 5 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
officials investigated the incident and found that the airline "acted in a
reasonable and thoughtful manner, based on a legitimate request to trans-
port a qualified individual with a disability and her service animal." 6 How-
ever, a USAirways spokesman said that the incident would not be repeated.
7
The requirement that airlines allow service animals to travel with
passengers who have disabilities is found in the regulations8 enacting the
* Education and Information Technology Specialist, Georgia Institute of Technology; Mem-
ber, State Bar of Texas; J.D., University of Texas School of Law, 1994; B.A., Baylor University,
1990. The author would like to thank his colleagues at the Southeast Disability and Business
Technical Assistance Center and the Center for Assistive Technology and Environmental Access.
1. Frank Dougherty, The Pig and 1: It's Just Sow-er Grapes, Jet-Set Pig's Owner Says She
Was Just Moving Pet, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 14, 2000, at 3.
2. An internal USAirways memo stated that Ms. Andrews said the pig weighed thirteen
pounds when she made the reservation. Id.
3. Id. Ms. Andrews stated that her doctor recommended that she "take the pig along for the
ride." Id.
4. Id.
5. Frank Dougherty, Sooey! Probers Asking Whose Swine Flew, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Nov.
3, 2000, at 3. Sources stated, "You can't believe how that dang pig squealed. It squealed so loud
passengers in the terminal gaped in amazement, their jaws drooping." Id. Other witnesses
claimed the pig "deposited a big, steamy mess" at the Seattle airport. Dougherty, supra note 1,
at 3.
6. Frank Dougherty, FAA: Unruly Pig Was OK, USAirways Was Right to Allow Sow, PHILA.
DAILY NEWS, Nov. 29, 2000, at 10.
7. Id.
8. 14 C.F.R. § 382.55(a) (1990) (requiring air carriers to allow passengers with disabilities to
travel with service animals). In this instance, the FAA concluded that Charlotte met the regulatory
definition of "service animal." See Dougherty, supra note 6, at 10. But see N.D. CENT. CODE §
25-13-01.1 (2002) (limiting the definition of service animals to dogs); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE
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Air Carrier Access Act of 1986 (ACAA).9 The ACAA was passed to
combat discrimination against persons with disabilities in air travel.' 0 It
provides that no air carrier, whether domestic or foreign, may discriminate
against an "otherwise qualified individual" on the basis of disability." The
ACAA defines the term "disability" as: "(1) the individual has a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities; (2) the individual has a record of such an impairment; [and] (3)
the individual is regarded as having such an impairment."12
Unlike the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)3 and other disabili-
ty discrimination laws, the text of the ACAA is little more than a simple
requirement of nondiscrimination. Because the text of the law does not 'set
forth any specific standards that air carriers must meet in serving passengers
with disabilities, air carriers must look to the regulations established by the
United States Department of Transportation (DOT), which enforces the
law.14 These regulations apply accessibility standards to aircraft cabins,
including lavatories.15 They also require airport terminals to meet the ADA
standards for access. 16 Under these regulations, an air carrier cannot refuse
to provide transportation to a qualified individual with a disability on the
basis of that disability unless the regulations specifically provide for such
refusal.17 Carriers must provide seating accommodations for passengers
ANN. § 121.002 (Vernon 2001) (requiring an "assistance animal" to be trained by a "reputable and
competent" organization).
9. Pub. L. No. 99-435, § 2, 100 Stat. 1080 (1986), amended by Pub. L. No. 103-272, §
41705, 108 Stat. 1141 (1994) and Pub. L. No. 106-181, § 707, 114 Stat. 158 (2000), codified at 49
U.S.C. § 41705 (2000). Some courts and commentators cite this law as the "Air Carriers Access
Act." See, e.g., Bower v. Fed. Express Corp., 96 F.3d 200, 202 (6th Cir 1996); Adiutori v. Sky
Harbor Int'l Airport, No. CV-93-01427, 1996 WL 673805, at *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 20, 1996); Nancy
Eisenhauer, Comment, Implied Causes of Action Under Federal Statutes: The Air Carriers
Access Act of 1986, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1183, 1183-84 (1992) (discussing the plight of disabled
airline passengers). This article will follow the usage of the Department of Transportation, the
federal agency responsible for implementing the ACAA. 14 C.F.R. § 382.1 (1990); Federal
Aviation Admin., New Horizons-Information for the Air Traveler With a Disability, available at
http://www.faa.gov/acr/dat.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2002).
10. 49 U.S.C. § 41705(a) (2000); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,
391 (2001).
11. 49 U.S.C. § 41705(a).
12. Id. Many other disability discrimination laws use a similar definition of disability. See
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000); Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §
705(20)(b) (2000); Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 190(b)(3) (2000); 49 U.S.C. § 24307(a)(2)
(2000); 2 U.S.C. § 1331(d)(1) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 12511(12) (2000); Telecommunications Act of
1996, 47 U.S.C. § 255(a)(1) (2000).
13. Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2, 104 Stat. 327 (1990); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
14. 14C.F.R. §§ 382.1-382.65 (1990).
15. Id. § 382.21.
16. Id. § 382.23; see also 36 C.F.R. § 1191, App. A (2001) (Americans with Disabilities Act
Accessibility Guidelines).
17. 14 C.F.R. § 382.31.
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with disabilities, such as allowing a person traveling with an assistance
animal a choice of bulkhead or non-bulkhead seating.18 They must also
provide boarding and deplaning assistance, as requested, to passengers with
disabilities.19 Additionally, the regulations provide specific guidance for
carriers in the stowing of wheelchairs and other personal auxiliary aids.20
Airlines may not charge individuals with disabilities for the cost of required
accommodations. 2'
There have been very few reported cases under the ACAA compared to
the ADA, which has seen over a thousand reported cases since it was en-
acted in 1990.22 The majority of reported ACAA cases have discussed pro-
cedural issues, such as the appropriate statute of limitations and the scope of
the law's applicability to different types of air carriers. 23 Another group of
ACAA cases has discussed substantive issues of alleged discrimination by
air carriers. 24  Other cases have discussed the appropriate remedies
available under the ACAA.25
This article will discuss the origins of the ACAA and Congress's intent
in passing the law. It will discuss cases where procedural questions were at
issue, cases where passengers with disabilities alleged discrimination by air
carriers, and approaches used by courts in determining damages available
under the ACAA. Finally, this article will discuss issues regarding
enforcement of the ACAA.
II. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION V. PARALYZED VETERANS
OF AMERICA AND THE PASSAGE OF THE ACAA
Congress passed the ACAA in response-to a 1986 Supreme Court
ruling regarding the responsibilities of air carriers to accommodate persons
with disabilities. 26 That case, United States Department of Transportation
18. Id. § 382.38.
19. Id. § 382.39.
20. Id. §§ 382.41, 382.43.
21. Id. § 382.57.
22. See American Bar Association, Study Finds Employers Win Most ADA Title I Judicial
and Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 403, 403 (May/
June 1998) (studying over one thousand ADA employment cases); Texas Governor's Committee
on People with Disabilities, ADA Definition of Disability Research Project, available at
http://www.governor.state.tx.us/disabilities/ada/ada-researchdefinition.htm (last visited June 10,
2002) (discussing research conducted on over 1100 ADA cases).
23. See infra Part III.
24. See infra Part IV.
25. See infra Part V.
26. Bower v. Fed. Express Corp., 96 F.3d 200, 210 (6th Cir. 1996); Moreno v. Consol. Rail
Corp., 63 F.3d 1404, 1411 n.1 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated by 70 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 1995); Anderson
v. USAir, 818 F.2d 49, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Tallarico v. Trans World Airlines, 693 F. Supp. 785,
788-89 (E.D. Mo. 1988), affd in part, rev'd in part, 881 F.2d 566, 569-70 (8th Cir. 1989);
2002]
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v. Paralyzed Veterans of America,27 dealt with whether § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 197328 applied to commercial airlines. 29
The District of Columbia Circuit found that the airlines were covered
under the provisions of § 504 because they received benefits from the
federal government's Airport Improvement Program, which provided grants
for airport construction and renovation. 30 However, the Supreme Court
disagreed with this finding.31 "It is not difficult to identify the recipient of
federal financial assistance under these Acts," Justice Powell wrote for the
majority. 32 "Congress has made it explicitly clear that these funds are to go
to airport operators. Not a single penny of the money is given to the
airlines. Thus, the recipient for purposes of § 504 is the operator of the
airport and not its users." 33
The plaintiffs argued that the airlines were "indirect" beneficiaries of
the federal airport construction grants. 34 This argument was based on the
Supreme Court's decision in Grove City College v. Bell,35 where the Court
found that the provisions of the Civil Rights Act extended to a college that
indirectly received federal funds via financial aid disbursed to students. 36
However, the Court in Paralyzed Veterans of America drew a distinc-
tion between the indirect funding received by Grove City College in Bell
and the benefits derived by the airlines through federal airport construction
grants.37 In Bell, the Court found that Congress intended to provide funding
to the colleges through its students.38 In Paralyzed Veterans of America,
the Court found that Congress intended to provide funding directly to the
airports, and not to the airlines. 39 Although the airlines benefited from the
"economic ripple effects" caused by the funding, they were not the intended
Shinault v. Am. Airlines Corp., 738 F. Supp. 193, 197 (S.D. Miss. 1990), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 936 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1991).
27. 477 U.S. 597 (1986).
28. The Rehabilitation Act is currently codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796(t) (2000).
29. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 477 U.S. at 599 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000) (pro-
hibiting discrimination on the basis of disability "under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance")).
30. Id. at 603 (citing Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 752 F.2d 694, 712-
13 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 605.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 606.
35. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
36. Bell, 465 U.S. at 576.
37. United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 606 (1986).
38. Id. at 606-07.
39. Id. at 607.
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recipients of that funding. 40 "By tying the scope of § 504 to economic
benefit derived from Trust Fund expenditures," Justice Powell wrote,
"respondents would give § 504 almost limitless coverage." 4 1
Justice Marshall's dissent noted that although the airlines were not
direct recipients of federal funding, they were in a "unique position" to
deny access to people with disabilities to the federally funded airport im-
provements.4 2 He stated, "If commercial airline companies barred [persons
with disabilities] from traveling on their airlines at all, then that conduct
would deny [persons with disabilities] the benefits of federally funded and
conducted programs and activities relating to the airport and airway sys-
tem."43 Unlike other entities that benefit from ripple effects of federal fund-
ing, Justice Marshall reasoned that airlines act as "gatekeepers" by choosing
who may benefit from the federal government's Airport Improvement
Program.44
Although Justice Marshall's reasoning was not adopted by the Court, it
was adopted by Congress. 45 Senator Bob Dole of Kansas, one of the spon-
sors of the ACAA, stated, "The purpose of the legislation is quite simple. It
overturns the recent Supreme Court decision in the case of Paralyzed
Veterans of America versus the Department of Transportation." 46 Senator
Dole was critical of the Supreme Court's reasoning, stating that "it is some-
what difficult, to say the least, to imagine that our airlines could operate
without airports or navigational aids and assistance. . . . I suppose it could
be described as an example of judicial self-restraint." 47 Senator Dole also
stated that the ACAA "is clearly in the best interests" of Americans with
disabilities, arguing that "they need and must have access to our public
transportation systems." 48 Congressman Norman Mineta of California also
noted the need to pass the ACAA in light of the Supreme Court decision.49
He stated, "I strongly believe that [passengers with disabilities] are entitled
to take full advantage of the mobility afforded by air transportation and that
40. Id.
41. Id. at 608. But see Ams. Disabled for Accessible Pub. Transp. (ADAPT) v. Skywest
Airlines, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 320, 322-23 (D. Utah 1991) (finding a cause of action under the
Rehabilitation Act when the airline accepted direct federal funding under the Essential Air Service
Program, 49 U.S.C. § 1389).
42. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 477 U.S. at 616 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
43. /d. at 615.
44. Id. at 616.




49. 132 CONG. REC. H7193 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1986) (statements of Rep. Mineta). Former
Representative Mineta is currently serving as the Secretary of Transportation.
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[people with disabilities] are entitled to be treated with dignity when they
travel." 50
III. LITIGATING PRETRIAL ISSUES UNDER THE ACAA
Many issues under the ACAA can be addressed prior to litigating each
case. Some fundamental issues under the ACAA have been whether a
private cause of action exists under the Act, whether the applicable statute
of limitations has run, and whether the plaintiff has a disability as defined
by the statute. Other issues that have arisen in ACAA cases are the scope
of the Act, whether it is preempted by international agreements, and
whether it preempts state law claims.
A. PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION
In November 1986, two months after the signing. of the ACAA,
thirteen-year-old Polly Tallarico attempted to board a Trans World Airways
(TWA) flight from Houston to St. Louis in order to visit her family during
the Thanksgiving holiday.51 Tallarico had cerebral palsy, a disease that
significantly limited her ability to walk and talk.52 She used a wheelchair
for mobility and used sign language and a communications board to
communicate with others. 53
TWA employees at Houston's Hobby Airport were aware of Tallari-
co's need for assistance prior to check-in, but were not aware that she was
thirteen years old or that she was unable to speak.54 After consulting with
other TWA employees, the Houston TWA staff determined that they would
not allow Tallarico to board the aircraft unaccompanied. 55 Tallarico's father
subsequently flew down from St. Louis and escorted his daughter on the
trip home.56 Tallarico and her parents subsequently filed suit under the
ACAA.57
Before trial, the court determined that Tallarico's parents did not have
an implied cause of action under the ACAA.58 The case proceeded.to trial,
and a jury awarded Tallarico $80,000 for her ACAA claim and $12,000 for
50. Id.
51. Tallarico v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 785, 787 (E.D. Mo. 1988), affd in
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other state law claims. 59 After the verdict, TWA moved that the verdict be
set aside or that a new trial be granted, arguing that the ACAA did not
create a private cause of action for plaintiffs to remedy alleged violations in
federal court.60
The court applied the four-part test set forth by the Supreme Court to
determine whether the ACAA created an implied private cause of action.6t
First, the court found that Tallarico was among the group of people that
Congress intended to protect under the ACAA because of her disability. 62
TWA argued that Tallarico was not in the protected class because she was
not "qualified" to fly alone, but the court found that Tallarico did meet the
statutory requirement of qualification. 63 Second, the court found that there
was implicit legislative intent to create a private cause of action.64 The
court reasoned that because the ACAA was similar to the Rehabilitation
Act, under which an implied private cause of action had been held to exist,
Congress implicitly intended to provide an implied private cause of action
under the ACAA.65
Third, the court did not find any inconsistency between Congress's
intent in passing the ACAA and providing a remedy for persons with
disabilities who allege a violation of the Act.66 Fourth, the court found that
discrimination in air travel was not a matter reserved for state courts. 67 The
court, therefore, found that the ACAA created an implied private right of
action for Tallarico and rejected TWA's motion.68 On appeal, the Eighth
Circuit affirmed the district court's findings.69
Tallarico v. Trans World Airways70 is generally accepted as authority
for the premise that individuals have a private right of action under the
ACAA.71 However, one commentator has suggested that the Tallarico
59. Id. at 788. Tallarico's state law claims consisted of three claims for breach of contract
and three claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id.'
60. Id.
61. Id. (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 788-89.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 789 (citing Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 979 (8th Cir. 1982), which found that




69. Tallarico v. Trans World Airways, 881 F.2d 566, 570 (8th Cir. 1989).
70. 881 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1989).
71. See Tunison v. Continental Airlines, Corp., 162 F.3d 1187, 1189 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1998);
Waters v. Port Auth. of N.J. & N.Y., 158 F. Supp. 2d 415, 432 (D.N.J. 2001); Turturro v. Con-
tinental Airlines, 128 F. Supp. 2d 170, 180 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Adiutori v. Sky Harbor Int'l
Airport, 880 F. Supp. 696, 700 (D. Ariz. 1995); Shinault v. Am. Airlines, 738 F. Supp. 193, 197
2002]
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court applied an improper standard in its analysis. 72 Author Nancy Eisen-
hauer pointed out in a 1992 law review article that the Tallarico decision
was based on a test enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Cort v.
Ash.73 However, the Cort test was overruled in 197974 by Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis.75
Transamerica set forth a two-pronged analysis for determining if a
private cause of action is implied under an act: (1) whether a statute creates
a federal statutory right for a class of individuals, and (2) whether Congress
intended that right to be enforced through private litigation. 76 Eisenhauer
argued that Transamerica was "the appropriate test for interpreting the
ACAA."77 Applying the terms of the Transamerica test to the ACAA,
Eisenhauer found that the ACAA was meant to protect private citizens from
discrimination and that the Supreme Court had endorsed the rights of
individuals to litigate private causes of action on the basis of discrimination
on Fourteenth Amendment grounds. 78 On the second prong of the Trans-
america test, Eisenhauer noted that the legislative history of the ACAA did
not provide any information on Congress's intent to provide a private right
of action, but argued that "the courts should construe the ACAA's silence
regarding a private cause of action as a legislative intention to provide for
such an action." 79
The most recent Supreme Court decision in this area, however, casts
doubt on whether a private right of action exists under the ACAA.80 In
Sandoval v. Alexander,S' the Court found that there was no private right of
action available to plaintiffs under regulations passed pursuant to § 602 of
(S.D. Miss. 1990). But see Bower v. Fed. Express Corp., 96 F.3d 200, 204 n.9 (6th Cir. 1996)
(refusing to decide whether a private right of action exists under the ACAA); Rivera v. City of
Phila., No. CIV.A. 96-CV-1 130, 1998 WL 67538, at *2 (E.D. Penn. Feb. 19, 1998) (finding that
the ACAA does not allow recovery of attorney's fees and that Congress did not expressly provide
a private right of action under the Act).
72. Eisenhauer, supra note 9, at 1184-86.
73. Id. at 1188 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)).
74. Id. at 1196 (citing Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 34 n.10
(1979)).
75. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
76. Eisenhauer, supra note 9, at 1196-97 (citing Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 17-18)).
77. Id. at 1194.
78. Id. at 1200 (citing Davis v Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 229 (1979)). But see Bd. of Trustees
of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (ruling that Title I of the ADA was not
passed in accordance with the Fourteenth Amendment).
79. Eisenhauer, supra note 9, at 1202.
80. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287-92 (2001).
81. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
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the Civil Rights Act.82 Applying this decision, the Eleventh Circuit has
concluded that no private right of action is available under the ACAA.83
In Love v. Delta Airlines,84 the Eleventh Circuit first concluded that the
ACAA did not specifically set forth a private right of action. 85 Second, the
court found that the ACAA regulations did not implicitly set forth a private
right of action.86 The court determined that the regulations created an
elaborate and comprehensive enforcement scheme requiring the Department
of Transportation to investigate each discrimination complaint.87 The DOT
has the authority to bring civil cases on its own or ask the Department of
Justice to do s0.88 Additionally, the airlines themselves are required to
establish consumer complaint procedures to resolve allegations of
discrimination. 89
Although the Love court found that these protections were extensive, it
pointed out one additional remedial avenue available to persons with
ACAA complaints. 90 The court pointed out that individuals could challenge
the failure of the DOT to investigate an ACAA complaint by filing a
petition for review with a circuit court.91 This avenue, the court reasoned,
powerfully suggested that Congress did not intend to provide other private
rights of action.92 The court rejected the Tallarico precedent, finding that
its application of the Cort standard was inappropriate after Sandoval.93 The
court determined that implying a private cause of action would not only fly
in the face of Congress's creation of various other remedial mechanisms
under the ACAA, but, would be in spite of the Act's provision for a
different form of judicial action in a different forum. 94
82. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293.
83. Love v. Delta Airlines, 310 F.3d 1347, 1360 (11 th Cir. 2002).
84. 310 F.3d 1347 (11 th Cir. 2002).
85. Love, 310 F.3d at 1354; see also Shinault v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 936 F.2d 796, 800 (5th
Cir. 1991); Tallarico v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 881 F.2d 566, 568 (8th Cir. 1989).
86. Love, 310 F.3d at 1354.
87. Id. But see Gottlieb v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. CIV.A. 94-4933, 1995 WL 41345, at *2
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 1995) (holding that judicial process, not the DOT complaint process, is the
appropriate forum to settle disputes).
88. Love, 310 F.3d at 1354.
89. Id. at 1355; see also Deterra v. Am. West Airlines, 226 F. Supp. 2d 298, 308 (D. Mass.
2002).
90. Love, 310 F.3d at 1355-56.
91. Id. at 1356 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a) (2000)).
92. Id. at 1357.
93. Id. at 1358-59.
94. Id. at 1358.
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B. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
As the ACAA is silent in setting up a private cause of action, it is also
silent in setting up an appropriate statute of limitations for such an action.
95
As a result, courts have generally looked to applicable state law to find
appropriate limitation periods. 96 In Squire v. United Airlines,97 a federal
court rejected a seven-year-old ACAA claim under a Colorado law calling
for a two-year statute of limitations in all cases arising under a federal
statute.98 The court also found that there was no "continuing violation" or
other action by the defendant that would toll the statute of limitations. 99
In Vaughn v. Northwest Airlines,100 the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted
a one-year statute of limitations pursuant to the Minnesota Human Rights
Act, a state law prohibiting discrimination against persons with
disabilities. 101
C. DEFINITION OF DISABILITY AND "QUALIFIED" INDIVIDUAL
In ADA litigation, defendants often contest whether plaintiffs meet the
statutory definition of disability. 02 However, the question of a plaintiff's
disability status is comparatively rare in ACAA litigation. In a 2000 case, a
California organization representing individuals with a height of six feet
two inches and above sued American Airlines under the California anti-
discrimination law for American Airlines' failure to provide extra leg room
for persons of this height. 03 The court ruled that the state law claims were
not preempted under the ACAA because the Act did not apply to the
plaintiffs.104 While the court acknowledged that tall people could find
95. Squire v. United Airlines, Inc., 973 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (D. Colo. 1997).
96. Id.; Vaughn v. Northwest Airlines, 558 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Minn. 1997) (citing Reed v.
United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 322-25 (1989)); Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y. v.
Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1980), modified in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985).
97. 973 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Colo. 1997).
98. Squire, 973 F. Supp. at 1007-08 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-102(g) (1986)).
99. Id. at 1008.
100. 558 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1997).
101. Vaughn, 558 N.W.2d at 738-39 (citing MINN. STAT. § 363.03(3)(a)(1) (1994)).
102. Curtis D. Edmonds, Snakes and Ladders: Expanding the Definition of "Major Life
Activity" in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 33 TEX. TECH L. REV. 321, 324 (2002); Mary
Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 623 (1999); Wendy Wilk-
inson, Judicially Crafted Barriers to Bringing Suit Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 38
S. TEX. L. REV. 907, 908 (1997).
103. Tall Club of Silicon Valley v. Am. Airlines, No. C 00-982 MJJ, 2000 WL 868524, at * I
(N.D. Cal. June 19, 2000).
104. Id. at *2.
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flying in cramped airline seats uncomfortable, it determined height did not
qualify as a disability under the ACAA.105
A 1997 Pennsylvania case, Rivera v. Delta Airlines,0 6 discussed the
ACAA definition of disability in depth. 0 7 One of the three plaintiffs in
Rivera, Verna Lee Jewell, was a person with rheumatoid arthritis, which
limited her ability to walk.108 Jewell contested the defendant's summary
judgment motion on her disability status, arguing that, as a person with an
actual disability and as a person "regarded as" having a disability, she met
the two prongs of the ACAA disability definition.09
The court first dismissed Jewell's argument that she was "regarded as"
having a disability on the grounds of "logical inconsistency.", o She argued
that Delta did not provide her a wheelchair to assist her in boarding a flight
out of Philadelphia International Airport.]'] The court pointed out that
Delta's refusal to provide this accommodation indicated that it did not treat
Jewell as having a disability and that her "regarded as" argument must
fail.112
Both Jewell and Delta agreed that Jewell experienced an impairment
that limited her ability to perform the "major life activity" of walking."r
3
The question before the court was whether Jewell was "substantially
limited" in her ability to walk. 114 Because the term "substantially limited"
was not found in the ACAA or the implementing regulations, the court
turned to the ADA regulations promulgated by the Equal Opportunity
Employment Commission. 1 5 The court then stated that the "analysis of
whether a person is within the class protected by the ADA or the ACAA is
functional, not scientific," suggesting that the analysis of disability status is
the same under both laws. 116
However, the Rivera court's analysis of Jewell's disability status was a
major departure from how courts have approached ADA cases. Delta
argued that Jewell did not present any evidence that her impairment was
105. Id.
106. No. CIV.A. 96-CV- 1130, 1997 WL 634500 (E.D. Penn. Sept. 26, 1997).
107. Rivera, 1997 WL 634500, at *1, *7.
108. Id. at *6.
109. Id. at *7.
110. Id.
111. Id. at *1.
112. Id. at *7.
113. Id. at *7-*8.
114. Id. at *8.
115. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1996)).
116. Id.
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substantially limiting."i7 The only type of evidence advanced by Jewell was
her deposition testimony, in which she stated that she experienced rheuma-
tism in one leg, but she had never received medical care for this condition
and had never used a wheelchair before requesting one from Delta.I18 The
court held that this unsupported deposition testimony was sufficient to
allow a jury to conclude that Jewell was substantially limited in her ability
to walk." 9 "There is no requirement," the court stated, "that a person
claiming that they are within the class protected by the ACAA show a prior
medical diagnosis or prior request for accommodation."' 20 Most courts
interpreting the ADA have held that plaintiffs must show more than
uncorroborated deposition testimony to meet the ADA disability
determination.'21
One other court interpreting the ACAA has followed this line of ADA
cases. 122 A California court hearing a case with mixed ACAA and ADA
claims found that the plaintiff, a person with arthritis and respiratory dis-
orders, did not meet either the ACAA or ADA definitions of disability.123
The plaintiff in this case failed to provide any evidence of his disability
except for a self-serving statement in his opposition brief.124
Likewise, courts have heard very few challenges as to whether an
individual plaintiff with a disability is "qualified" to be an airline passenger.
Tallarico, which involved an individual with severe cerebral palsy, is one of
the few cases that has discussed this issue. 25 In the opinion of the trial
court, Tallarico was not a "qualified" passenger due to the severity of her
disability, her inability to communicate with airline personnel, and her diffi-
culty in understanding and complying with safety-related requests. 126 How-
ever, the trial court did not overturn the jury's finding that Tallarico was
indeed "qualified," finding that no "miscarriage of justice" resulted from
the verdict.127  The Eighth Circuit agreed with the jury, finding that
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at *9.
120. Id. at *8.
121. See, e.g., Aldrup v. Caldera, 274 F.3d 282, 287 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating "[tlhe district
court properly determined that such unsupported conclusional statements are not entitled to evi-
dentiary weight"); Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d 402,407 (3d Cir. 2000).
122. McIntyre v. City & County of S.F., No. C-01-1244-CRB, 2001 WL 1679154, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2001).
123. Id.
124. Id.
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Tallarico could fasten her own seat belt, put on her own oxygen mask, and
communicate with airline personnel if needed. 128
At the time of Tallarico, no definition of "qualified handicapped indi-
vidual" was available because the relevant Department of Transportation
regulations had not been promulgated.129 The DOT later created a very
loose definition, which basically requires a passenger with a disability to
purchase a ticket and to meet reasonable, nondiscriminatory requirements
applicable to all airline passengers.130 This definition has proven loose
enough that most defendants do not contest whether an individual passenger
with a disability is "qualified."]31
D. SCOPE OF THE ACAA
Several courts have dealt with the issue of how broadly the ACAA
should be construed. In Squire, the court dismissed the ACAA claims of
three individuals who were denied employment by United Airlines, finding
that the ACAA was meant to apply to customers rather than employees or
prospective employees.132 In Wilson v. United Airlines,133 the court found
that a private company that provided assistance to passengers with
disabilities under contract with United Airlines was not covered under the
ACAA.134 The court found that the company, which provided wheelchairs
for passengers with disabilities in the airport terminal, was not a "direct" or
"indirect" provider of air transportation services.1 35 The court did not ad-
dress whether the company could have been liable under the ACAA under
either a third-party beneficiary theory or an agency theory because the
plaintiff did not raise those theories in her complaint. 136
In Bower v. Federal Express Corp.,137 the Sixth Circuit dealt with a
case involving both the application of the ACAA to airline employees and
the extent of the definition of an "air carrier," although under markedly
128. Tallarico v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 881 F.2d 566, 569 (8th Cir. 1989).
129. Id.
130. 14 C.F.R. § 382.3(c) (1990).
131. See Price v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 226, 233 (D. Vt. 1998); Adiutori v. Sky
Harbor Int'l Airport, 880 F. Supp. 696, 700 (D. Ariz. 1995); see also Newman v. Am. Airlines,
176 F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that the plaintiff was "qualified" based on her disa-
bility status); Love v. Delta Airlines, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1328 (M.D. Ala. 2001), rev'd on other
grounds, 310 F.3d 1347 (1 1th Cir. 2002).
132. Squire v. United Airlines, Inc., 973 F. Supp. 1004, 1009 (D. Colo. 1997) (citing Kodish
v. United Airlines, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 1245, 1248 (D. Colo. 1979)).
133. No. 94C5411, 1995 WL 530653 (N.D. I11. Sept. 7, 1995).
134. Wilson, 1995 WL 530653, at *3.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 96 F.3d 200 (6th Cir. 1996).
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different circumstances than Squire and Wilson. 38 Richard Bower, a per-
son with spina bifida who used crutches and leg braces to walk, was denied
the opportunity to ride as a passenger on a "jumpseat" basis on cargo planes
operated by his employer, Federal Express (FedEx).139 FedEx routinely
allowed its employees to ride as passengers on company-operated cargo
planes, but did not allow Bower to ride due to alleged safety concerns.140
The district court ruled that Bower did not state a claim because the
ACAA did not apply to FedEx.'4 The Sixth Circuit reversed this finding,
holding that the plain language of the statutory definition of "air carrier"
covered FedEx.142 FedEx then argued that the ACAA regulations restricted
"qualified" individuals to the passenger airline setting.143 The regulations
provided that a "qualified" individual under the ACAA was one who was
able to use "ground facilities offered to the general public" and who had
purchased a ticket.44
Given its decision that the ACAA applied to FedEx, the Sixth Circuit
ruled that the regulatory interpretation advocated by FedEx would create an
"absurd result."' 145 The court criticized the ACAA regulations for limiting
their scope to passenger airliners and not considering passengers on cargo
airliners.146 The court then ruled that FedEx owed some duty to accom-
modate Bower and remanded the case to the district court to determine
whether he was "qualified."1 47 The district court consolidated Bower's
ACAA claim with other pending ADA claims by other similarly situated
employees and analyzed the issue of the plaintiffs' qualifications under the
rubric of the ADA.148 The district court determined that FedEx could valid-
ly discriminate against the plaintiffs because of safety-related concerns rela-
tive to their ability to exit the plane in an emergency. 49 However, the court
determined that whether FedEx could have provided a reasonable accom-
modation for the plaintiffs, such as rearranging seating configurations,
should be submitted to the factfinder.150
138. Bower, 96 F.3d at 206.
139. Id. at 202.
140. Id.; see also CAST AWAY (20th Century Fox & DreamWorks SKG 2000) (portraying
Federal Express employees flying on company cargo flights).
141. Bower, 96 F.3d at 202-03.
142. Id. at 204 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(2) (1961)).
143. Id. at 206.
144. Id. at 207 (citing 14 C.F.R. § 382.5 (1990)).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 209.
147. Id. at 210.
148. Bower v. Fed. Express Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d 678, 682, 686-87 (W.D. Tenn. 2001).
149. Id. at 687.
150. Id. at 687-88.
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E. PREEMPTION
Because of the international nature of the airline business, one impor-
tant issue in ACAA litigation has been whether international treaties on air
travel preempt a plaintiff's rights under the ACAA. One California court
dealt with this question in a case involving Sidney Brandt, a person with
myasthenia gravis, a degenerative muscle disease.151 Mr. Brandt and his
wife were aboard an American Airlines flight originating from Winnipeg,
Manitoba, Canada, and terminating at San Francisco.152 Mr. Brandt had to
take medication, with food, to prevent leg cramping.153 He requested food
from the flight attendants, who informed him that food was not available to
coach passengers on the flight.154 After an altercation with the flight crew
while the plane was on the ground at Dallas-Fort Worth International
Airport, the Brandts were ejected from the plane.155 They were placed on a
different flight, where Mr. Brandt eventually received some food and was
able to take his medication. 156
American argued that the Warsaw Convention (Convention),157 an
international treaty covering liability to airline passengers on international
flights, preempted the Brandts' claims.158 The court found that there was
no authority governing whether federal anti-discrimination laws fell within
the scope of the Warsaw Convention.159 However, the court pointed to the
purpose of the Convention, which was to provide uniformity in liability
claims against international carriers. 160 The court determined that allowing
ACAA claims would undercut this purpose and found that the Warsaw
Convention preempted the Brandts' claims.161
After Brandt, Congress amended the ACAA to specifically include
foreign air carriers.162 However, this amendment limited coverage to 49




154. Id. at*l -*2.
155. Id. at *2.
156. Id.
157. The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transpor-
tation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 40105
(2000).
158. Brandt v. Am. Airlines, No. C 98-2089 SI, 2000 WL 288393, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13,
2000).
159. Id. at *5.
160. Id. at *4.
161. Id.
162. Pub. L. No. 106-181, § 707, 114 Stat. 158 (2000).
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U.S.C. § 40105, where the Warsaw Convention is reprinted.163 In Turturro
v. Continental Airlines,164 a New York court found that the ACAA amend-
ment did not show Congressional intent to rescind the Warsaw Convention
to allow ACAA claims against international carriers. 65 The court found that
the Warsaw Convention "massively curtails damage awards for victims of
horrible acts such as terrorism; the fact that the Convention also abridges
recovery for the lesser offense of discrimination should not surprise
anyone."' 66 This decision was followed by a New Jersey court, which
found that the reasoning applied by the Turturro court against a domestic
airline applied to Alitalia, a foreign airline. 167
However, one court found that a domestic airline could be liable for the
ACAA violations of a foreign airline on the basis of a contractual
agreement.168 In this case, the plaintiff was not allowed to purchase a ticket
from Alitalia because he used a wheelchair, unless he bought a second
ticket for an attendant.169 At that time, Alitalia and Continental had a code-
sharing agreement where Alitalia sold tickets for flights operated by Con-
tinental. 70 The court found that Continental could not escape its ACAA
responsibilities by contracting ticket sales with a foreign carrier. ' 7'
Another preemption issue in ACAA litigation is whether the ACAA
itself preempts state law claims. In Moore v. Northwest Airlines,172 the
plaintiff brought a negligence claim under state law after he was injured
when his wheelchair overturned in the jetway while exiting a Northwest
Airlines flight out of Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport. 173 The court
found that the standard for determining whether the plaintiff's negligence
claim was preempted by the ACAA was the standard used under federal
aviation law, which preempts state law claims regarding prices, routes, and
services of air carriers. 174 Although deplaning is technically a "service"
provided to passengers, the Moore court found that the term only applied to
163. Turturro v. Continental Airlines, 128 F. Supp. 2d 170, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
164. 128 F. Supp. 2d 170 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
165. Turturro, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 180.
166. Id. at 181.
167. Waters v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 158 F. Supp. 2d 415, 429-30 (D.N.J. 2001).
168. DeGirolamo v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 159 F. Supp. 2d 764, 768-69
(D.N.J. 2001).
169. Id. at 765-66.
170. Id. at 765.
171. Id. at 768-69.
172. 897 F. Supp. 313 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
173. Moore, 897 F. Supp. at 314.
174. Id. at 315 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (2000)).
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services performed in an economic or contractual context, and therefore, the
ACAA did not preempt the plaintiff's negligence claims. 175
A different result was reached by a Tennessee court hearing a claim of
false imprisonment by a passenger in a wheelchair who was not allowed to
board Express Airlines and Northwest Airline flights from Memphis.1 76
The court in Williams v. Express Airlines I, Inc.177 held that the process of
boarding a plane logically related to airline service and was connected with
air transportation, and found that the ACAA preempted the plaintiff's state
law claims. 178
The Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion in a later case, finding
that the ACAA preempted a state claim for damages due to emotional dis-
tress because boarding and deplaning passengers constituted a "service." 179
However, another Ninth Circuit panel reached the opposite conclusion two
years later in Newman v. American Airlines.180 The Newman panel found
that the term "service" should be used in a "public utility" sense and found
that the term did not apply to ACAA claims.18
The district court in Bower addressed whether a Tennessee anti-
discrimination law was preempted by an ACAA claim.182 In that case, the
question was whether passengers with disabilities could meet the exit-row
safety requirements.18 3 The court found that the state law claims were
preempted because safety-related concerns were connected to the provision
of airline services.184
IV. DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS UNDER THE ACAA
Relatively few cases have addressed the actual duty of air carriers to
provide nondiscriminatory services under the ACAA. In most of the cases,
175. Id. at 315-16; see also Price v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 226, 236 (D. Vt.
1998).
176. Williams v. Express Airlines I, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 831, 833 (W.D. Tenn. 1993). But see
Rivera v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. CIV.A. 96-CV-1 130, 1997 WL 634500, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept.
26, 1997) (finding that the failure to provide services to a passenger with a disability in an airline
terminal did not trigger preemption).
177. 825 F. Supp. 831 (W.D. Tenn. 1993).
178. Williams, 825 F. Supp. at 833.
179. Gee v. Southwest Airlines, 110 F.3d 1400, 1406 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled by Charas v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 1998).
180. 176 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 1999).
181. Newman, 176 F.3d at 1131.
182. Bower v. Fed. Express Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d 678, 689 (W.D. Tenn. 2001).
183. Id. at 690.
184. Id.
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the courts have looked to the Department of Transportation regulations to
determine the duty of an airline to passengers with disabilities.18 5
In Adiutori v. Sky Harbor International Airport, 86 the plaintiff argued
that America West Airlines violated the ACAA by leaving him unattended
at a shuttle stop and then not providing him assistance in boarding a shuttle
bus.187 The court, however, found that the plaintiff never asked for assis-
tance, noting that the plaintiff testified in his deposition that he was "not the
complaining type" and "ask[s] nothing from nobody," including not asking
for "charity and help."' 88 Therefore, the court found that the carrier did not
violate the ACAA.189
In Deterra v. America West Airlines,190 the plaintiff argued that Ameri-
ca West violated the ACAA when a gate agent refused to address him
directly, conversed exclusively with his relatives while ignoring him, and
referring to him as "it." 191 The court found that the ACAA regulations
referred to services provided by the airlines and did not reach to distasteful
or uncivil comments made by airline personnel. 192
In Boswell v. Skywest Airlines,193 the plaintiff argued that the airline
violated the ADA by refusing to allow her to carry medical oxygen on
board. 194 The court found that carriers were only required to carry oxygen
under strict FAA regulations, and that carriers were not required to carry
oxygen by the ACAA.195
One of the few cases to discuss the anti-discrimination provisions
of the ACAA in depth, Price v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 196 involved a person
with acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). 197 Gregory Price
185. See Newman, 176 F.3d at 1131 (air carrier may have violated 14 C.F.R. § 382.31); Gee
v. Southwest Airlines, 110 F.3d 1400, 1403 (9th Cir. 1997) (air carrier violated ACAA through
failure to provide onboard wheelchair); Shinault v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 936 F.2d 796, 800 (5th Cir.
1991) (airline refused to allow a passenger using a wheelchair to board); Love v. Delta Airlines,
179 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1329 (M.D. Ala. 2001) rev'd on other grounds, 310 F.3d 1347 (11 th Cir.
2002) (airline may have violated 14 C.F.R. § 382.21 by not having onboard wheelchair);
DeGirolamo v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 159 F. Supp. 2d 764, 768 (D.N.J. 2001) (air
carrier's contractor violated 14 C.F.R. §§ 382.7 and 382.35).
186. No. 95-15774, 1996 WL 673805 (9th Cir. Nov. 20, 1996).
187. Adiutori, 1996 WL 673805, at *3.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. 226 F. Supp. 2d 298 (D. Mass. 2002)
191. Deterra, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 300.
192. Id. at 306.
193. 217 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (D. Utah 2002).
194. Boswell, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 1214.
195. Id. at 1221.
196. 5 F. Supp. 2d 226 (D. Vt. 1998).
197. Price, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 228.
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experienced Kaposi's sarcoma, a cancerous disease that caused lesions on
his skin.19 8 These lesions were inflamed and ulcerated, and fluid emanating
from them caused a foul smell.' 99 Price and his mother boarded a Comair
Airlines aircraft from Burlington, Vermont, for a flight that would
eventually connect to a Delta Airlines flight arriving in Miami.200
While on the ground at a connecting stop in Manchester, New Hamp-
shire, a flight attendant began to notice a foul, nauseating odor and deter-
mined that it came from Price.20' The flight crew refused to continue the
flight given the noxious odor, and Price and his mother were taken off the
plane.202 The airline paid for meals and a hotel room for Price and his
mother, and they boarded a plane the following day and landed in Miami
without incident.203 Price died four weeks later. 204
The defendants argued that Price was removed from the flight for
safety reasons.2 05 The plaintiffs argued that the safety concerns were a
pretext for discrimination and that the flight crew's actions were motivated
by the comfort and convenience of other passengers. 06 The defendants
pointed to ACAA regulations that allow a pilot to remove a passenger with
a disability in the interests of safety.207 However, the plaintiffs pointed out
that the in-flight report of the flight crew contained no mention of safety
concerns.2 08  The court ruled that there was enough evidence of
discrimination to deny the defendant's claims for summary judgment. 209
V. AVAILABLE REMEDIES UNDER THE ACAA
A. DAMAGES
The issue of available damages has been much more contentious in
ACAA litigation than the issues surrounding discrimination. One of the
first courts to discuss available damages was the Eighth Circuit in
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 228-29.
201. Id. at 229.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 228.
205. Id. at 233.
206. Id.
207. Id. (citing 14 C.F.R. § 382.31(d) (1990)). But see 14 C.F.R. § 382.31(b) (1990) (stating
"[a] carrier shall not refuse to provide transportation to a qualified individual with a disability
solely because the person's disability results in appearance or involuntary behavior that may
offend, annoy, or inconvenience crewmembers or other passengers").
208. Price v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 226, 233 (D. Vt. 1998).
209. Id.
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Tallarico, which addressed whether emotional and punitive damages were
available under the ACAA.210 The jury in Tallarico had allotted $80,000 in
damages, but the district court only allowed $1350 in damages to compen-
sate the Tallarico family for out-of-pocket expenses. 211 The district court
determined that the remaining amount was attributable to emotional
distress, which it ruled was not allowable under the ACAA.212
However, the circuit court found no basis in the ACAA for disallowing
such damages and noted that emotional distress damages were allowable
under other civil rights legislation, such as § 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act.213 As a result, the circuit court found evidence of emotional stress in
the testimony and allowed the entire $80,000 verdict. 214 The Tallarico
court did not address the availability of punitive damages, ruling instead
that the plaintiffs did not provide enough evidence to support such an
award. 215
This finding was challenged by two district courts in Shinault v. Ameri-
can Airlines21 6 and Americans Disabled for Accessible Public Transporta-
tion (ADAPT) v. Skywest Airlines, Inc.2 17 The Shinault court found that the
ACAA was more closely aligned with the Rehabilitation Act, which does
not allow emotional damages or punitive damages, and refused to award
such damages to the plaintiff.218 The court in ADAPT went a step further,
finding that the ACAA was "in pari material" with the Rehabilitation Act,
and also disallowed emotional and punitive damages. 219
The Fifth Circuit, in hearing Shinault on appeal, disagreed with the dis-
trict court and found that emotional damages were available under the
ACAA.220 The circuit court rejected attempts to "match" up the damages
available under the different federal anti-discrimination statutes.221 Instead,
the court applied a canon of statutory construction that provides that plain-
tiffs have access to all "necessary and appropriate remedies" unless other-
wise provided.222 "Because Congress did not limit the available remedies
210. Tallarico v. Trans World Airways, 881 F.2d 566, 570-71 (8th Cir. 1989).
211. Id. at 570.
212. Id.
213. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
214. Id. at 571.
215. Id. at 572.
216. 738 F. Supp. 193 (S.D. Miss. 1990), affd in part, rev'd in part, 936 F.2d 796 (5th Cir.
1991).
217. 762 F. Supp. 320 (D. Utah 1991).
218. Shinault, 738 F. Supp. at 199.
219. ADAPT, 762 F. Supp. at 327.
220. Shinault v. American Airlines, 936 F.2d 796, 804 (5th Cir. 1991).
221. Id.
222. id. (citing Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969)).
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under the ACAA," the Shinault court stated, "we conclude that Congress
intended to allow private plaintiffs to recover all necessary and appropriate
remedies." 223 However, the court did not allow punitive damages in the
case because of a lack of evidence of "wanton or malicious conduct" by the
airline.224
B. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Due to the comprehensive nature of the Department of Transportation
regulations, courts have generally denied injunctive relief to passengers
with disabilities in ACAA cases. In ADAPT, the court found that such
relief would be "duplicitous and unnecessary" due to the presence of the
federal regulations. 225 In Shinault, the Fifth Circuit referred the plaintiff's
claim for injunctive relief to the DOT out of deference to the available
administrative remedies. 226 However, the court stated that this was not a
blanket rule, holding instead that the DOT "should ordinarily have the first
opportunity to hear claims requiring prospective relief."22
7
VI. ENFORCING THE ACAA
In 1999, the National Council on Disability (NCD) issued a report
regarding the enforcement of the ACAA by the Department of Transporta-
tion. 228 The report summarized some of the unresolved challenges facing
passengers with disabilities as follows:
More accommodations are available for air travelers with disabili-
ties today than ever before, but the availability of accommodations
is inconsistent, and discriminatory treatment continues. It is
important to recognize that the negative experiences of disabled
travelers go beyond the typical hassles to which frequent travelers
are accustomed. Notwithstanding the fact that ACAA has been the
223. Id.
224. Id.; Gee v. Southwest Airlines, 110 F.3d 1400, 1408 (9th Cir. 1997); DeGirolamo v.
Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 159 F. Supp. 2d 764, 769 (D.N.J. 2001); see also Price v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 226, 238 (D. Vt. 1998) (assuming that punitive damages were
available); Rivera v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. CIV.A. 96-CV-1 130, 1997 WL 634500, at *7 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 26, 1997) (finding it unnecessary to rule on whether punitive damages were available).
225. ADAPT v. Skywest Airlines, 762 F. Supp. 320, 327 (D. Utah 1991).
226. Shinault v. American Airlines, 936 F.2d 796, 805 (5th Cir. 1991).
227. Id.; see also Gottlieb v. Am. Airlines, No. CIV.A. 94-4933, 1995 WL 41345, at *2
(E.D. Penn. Feb. 2, 1995) (ruling that the plaintiff could possibly be entitled to injunctive relief
outside the agency's regulatory scheme).
228. National Council on Disability, Enforcing the Civil Rights of Air Travelers with Disabil-
ities: Recommendations for the Department of Transportation and Congress (Feb. 26, 1999),
available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/acaa.html.
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law for more than twelve years, people who use wheelchairs
continue to encounter regular problems, from not being given a
bulkhead seat to being mishandled and occasionally dropped by
poorly trained or insensitive staff. Flight crews continue to refuse
to stow adaptive equipment such as walkers and folding wheel-
chairs in the aircraft cabin. Travelers with disabilities who are
accompanied by able-bodied friends, colleagues, or relatives often
find that airline personnel have a tendency to direct questions and
instructions to their travel partners rather than address them direct-
ly. In short, air travelers with disabilities frequently find air travel
unnecessarily humiliating and upsetting. Many problems stem
from the unwillingness of some airline staff to recognize that a
request for an accommodation in air travel invokes civil rights
protections. ACAA is a rights law, but it has been largely
implemented with the consistency of a customer service policy.2
29
The NCD report contained several findings critical of the DOT's
enforcement of the ACAA. First, NCD found that the budget and staff
allocated by the DOT for enforcement of the ACAA were "drastically
inadequate." 230 NCD also found fault with the DOT's efforts to educate air
travelers with disabilities about their rights under the ACAA.231 The NCD
further found that the DOT was not investigating complaints by passengers
with disabilities sent directly to air carriers; this was a concern because air
carriers receive approximately one hundred times as many complaints as the
DOT.232
The NCD report contained several suggestions for new legislation. 233
In 2000, Congress amended the ACAA, following several of the recom-
mendations in the NCD report.234 The 2000 amendments provide that
foreign carriers are explicitly covered by the ACAA, pursuant to the provi-
sions of the Warsaw Convention.2 35 Additionally, the Secretary of Trans-
portation must investigate each ACAA complaint. 236 The DOT must gather






234. Pub. L. No. 106-18 1, § 707, 114 Stat. 158 (2000); see also Reporting Requirements for
Disability-Related Complaints, 67 Fed. Reg. 6892 (Feb. 14, 2002) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt.
382).
235. 49 U.S.C. § 41705(a) (2000).
236. Id. § 41705(c)(1).
237. Id. § 41705(c)(2).
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Congress. 238 Finally, the new law requires the DOT to work with the NCD,
the Department of Justice, and the United States Architectural and Trans-
portation Barriers Compliance Board to develop new technical assistance
material.239
The DOT has published disability-related data as part of a monthly
report of all airline-related consumer complaints since 1998.240 In 1998, the
DOT took 331 complaints, or slightly over 4% of the total complaints. 241 In
2000, the number of disability-related complaints increased to 612, slightly
under 3% of the total complaints. 242
VII. CONCLUSION
Marca Bristo, chairperson of the NCD, made the following statement
on the release of the NCD's report on ACAA enforcement:
From my own personal experience, I have an unfortunate wealth
of horror stories on which to draw to underscore the range and
frequency of violations I and others encounter when we fly. I am
reminded of the time when I was seven months pregnant and
forced to sit in an aisle chair at the door of the airplane in the
winter while the entire airplane shuttled [past] me because they
were unable to find someone to lift me onto the plane. Or the time
when I asked the flight attendant to check on my wheelchair and
learned from the pilot that it had been accidentally given to another
passenger. Or the time when I was left on the plane for forty-five
minutes with the lights out because the staff had forgotten that I
was still on the plane. When these kinds of things occur, you feel
angry, humiliated, sometimes afraid, not in control, violated. The
emotional damage is not easily forgotten or repaired. For some
people with disabilities, flying is so unbearable that any alternative
means of transportation will be used.
243
238. Id. § 41705(c)(3).
239. Id. § 41705(c)(4).
240. U.S. Dep't of Transportation, Air Travel Consumer Report, (monthly 1998-2002),
available at http://www.dot.gov/airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/report.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2002).
241. U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2001, 659, 670 (2001),
available at http://www.census.gov/pnod/2002pubs/0lstatab (last visited Nov. 6, 2002) (selecting
trans.pdf).
242. Id. By comparison, the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission handled 15,864
employment discrimination complaints under the ADA in 2000. See U.S. Equal Employment Op-
portunity Comm'n, ADA Charge Data by Impairments/Bases-Receipts, available at http://www.
eeoc.gov/stats/ada-receipts.html (last modified Feb. 22, 2002).
243. Marca Bristo, Opening Statement by Marca Bristo, Chairperson, National Council on
Disability (Mar. 18, 1999), available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/testimony/ncd-acaa_3-18-
99.html.
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This statement presents a gloomy view of the ACAA and its effect on
lessening discrimination against passengers with disabilities in air travel.
However, there is some cause for hope. Airlines are becoming more and
more aware that people with disabilities represent a growing market. 244
One airline spokeswoman reported that her airline received more than 1.5
million requests in 2001 for assistance from passengers who use wheel-
chairs. 245 "Not only is [serving passengers with disabilities] the right thing
to do," she said, "it is also smart business." 246 Despite the difficulties of
traveling with a disability, which were compounded by the increased securi-
ty restrictions adopted after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
more and more people with disabilities are taking to the skies.247 A Florida
passenger told The New York Times that "travel with a disability is now a
million times better than it used to be." 248
One obvious conclusion regarding whether the level of discrimination
for air travelers with disabilities is better than it once was is that litigation
under the ACAA has not played a major role in improving service. The
most remarkable thing about researching ACAA litigation is that there are
so few cases brought by air travelers. 249 The issues in these lawsuits
generally have little to do with substantive issues regarding actual discrimi-
nation and more to do with procedural issues. There have been very few, if
any "landmark" cases in ACAA litigation that have brought about
measurable changes in the way airlines treat customers with disabilities.
If the ACAA has sparked changes in the way that airlines treat pas-
sengers with disabilities, such change has come about through the airlines'
compliance with the Department of Transportation regulations or through
244. Dana Canedy, Wheelchair Users Fly More and Airlines Try to Adapt, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
2, 2002, at A 12.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.; see also U.S. Dep't of Trans., Fact Sheet: Steps Taken to Ensure New Security
Requirements Preserve and Respect the Civil Rights of People with Disabilities (Oct. 29, 2001),
available at http://www.dot.gov/airconsumer/Civil%20Rights%2OFact%20Sheet.htm (describing
the effect of new security requirements on people with disabilities); National Council on Disa-
bility, Letter to the Honorable Jane F. Garvey (Oct. 19, 2001), available at http://www.ncd.gov/
newsroom/correspondence/garvey_10-19-01.html (expressing concerns regarding new security
requirements).
248. Canedy, supra note 244, at A12.
249. See Bristo, supra note 243. Ms. Bristo stated:
Plaintiffs who bring a civil lawsuit and win are not entitled to reasonable attorney's
fees under law, or even compensatory damages. When compensatory damages or even
attorney's fees cannot be ensured, few plaintiffs with disabilities can afford to fight a
lawsuit. As a result, very few suits have been brought despite the numerous and
continuing violations.
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the DOT's enforcement of those regulations. To this date, litigation has not
played a major role in improving the experiences of travelers with
disabilities. However, this should not lead to complacency for the airlines
or people with disabilities. ACAA compliance is an ongoing responsibility,
and airlines that neglect this growing market of passengers could face
further litigation and complaints down the road.
However, if other circuits follow the lead of the Eleventh Circuit and
adopt the precedent in Love v. Delta Airlines, future ACAA litigation may
be forestalled permanently. In light of this decision, Congress should
consider amending the ACAA to include provisions regarding an
individual's right to sue and the availability of remedies to individual
plaintiffs, including attorneys' fees and punitive damages. Congress could,
for example, stipulate that ACAA plaintiffs have the same remedies as
plaintiffs under the Civil Rights Act. 250 Amending the ACAA to include a
private right of action would provide airline passengers with disabilities the
same rights as other civil rights plaintiffs, and would ensure that litigation
would be available to combat potential discrimination in air travel.
250. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3, 12188(a)(1) (2000) (adopting Civil Rights Act remedies and
procedures for plaintiffs under Title III of the ADA).
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